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  • 【期刊】 Book Review: Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism

    刊名:Vision: The Journal of Business Perspective 作者:Kaushal ; Leena Ajit 年份:2017
    摘要:
  • 【期刊】 美国分享经济发展模式

    刊名:高科技与产业化 作者:Arun Sundararajan ; 西京京 ; 叶如诗 机构:纽约大学 ; 纽约大学 ; 中国互联网协会分享经济工作委员会 年份:2016
    摘要:我居住在纽约的曼哈顿,没有买车,但在这里也算普遍现象,曼哈顿拥有汽车的家庭不足四分之一。但有时我也有用车需求,要在曼哈顿租到一辆经济实惠的汽车很难,通常要前往几英里之外的皇后区或新泽西州,才能租到日租金少于一百美元的汽车。
  • 【期刊】 Local network effects and network structure

    作者:Arun Sundararajan 关键词:network effects; adoption game; network formation 机构:New York University ; New York University ; Leonard N. Stern School of Business 年份:2005
    摘要:This paper presents a model of local network effects in which agents connected in a social network each value the adoption of a product by a heterogeneous subset of other agents in their 'neighborhood', and have incomplete information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities between all other agents. I show that the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of a general adoption game are in monotone strategies, can be strictly Pareto-ranked based on a scalar neighbor-adoption probability value, and that the greatest such equilibrium is uniquely coalition-proof. Each Bayes-Nash equilibrium has a corresponding fulfilled-expectations equilib- rium under which agents form local adoption expectations. Examples illustrate cases in which the social network is an instance of a Poisson random graph, when it is a complete graph, a standard model of network effects, and when it is a generalized random graph. A generating function describing the structure of networks of adopting agents is characterized as a function of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium they play, and empirical implications of this characterization are discussed.
  • 【期刊】 Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing and Protection

    摘要:This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules and technological deterrence levels in a market with digital piracy where sellers can influence the degree of piracy by implementing digital rights management (DRM) systems. It is shown that a monopolist's optimal pricing schedule can be characterized as a simple combination of the zero-piracy pricing schedule and a piracy-indifferent pricing schedule that makes all customers indifferent between legal usage and piracy. An increase in the quality of pirated goods, while lowering prices and profits, increases total surplus by expanding both the fraction of legal users and the volume of legal usage. In the absence of price discrimination, a seller's optimal level of technology-based protection against piracy is shown to be at the technologically maximal level, which maximizes the difference between the quality of the legal and pirated goods. However, when a seller can price discriminate, its optimal choice is always a strictly lower level of technology-based protection. These results are based on the following digital rights conjecture: that granting digital rights increases the incidence of digital piracy, and that managing digital rights therefore involves restricting the rights of usage that contribute to customer value. Moreover, if a digital rights management system weakens over time due to the underlying technology being progressively hacked, a seller's optimal strategic response may involve either increasing or decreasing its level of technology-based protection. This direction of change is related to whether the DRM technology implementing each marginal reduction in piracy is increasingly less or more vulnerable to hacking. Pricing and technology choice guidelines are presented, and some welfare implications are discussed
  • 【期刊】 Nonlinear pricing and type-dependent network effects

    作者:Arun Sundararajan 关键词:Nonlinear Pricing; Network Effects; Type-dependent 机构:Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; New York University 年份:2004
    摘要:Network effects can reduce consumption levels across customers when a monopolist chooses optimal nonlinear pricing. The direction and extent of these distortions depend on the relative rates of variation in marginal intrinsic value and marginal network value with customer type.
  • 【期刊】 Evaluating Pricing Strategy Using e-Commerce Data: Evidence and Estimation Challenges

    作者:Anindya Ghose ; Arun Sundararajan 关键词:Electronic commerce; pricing strategy; price discrimination; versioning; quality differentiation; sales rank 机构:Operations and Management Sciences ; Operations and Management Sciences ; Center for Digital Economy Research, Leonard N. Stern School of Business 年份:2006
    摘要:As Internet-based commerce becomes increasingly widespread, large data sets about the demand for and pricing of a wide variety of products become available. These present exciting new opportunities for empirical economic and business research, but also raise new statis- tical issues and challenges. In this article, we summarize research that aims to assess the optimality of price discrimination in the software industry using a large e-commerce panel data set gathered from Ama- zon.com. We describe the key parameters that relate to demand and cost that must be reliably estimated to accomplish this research suc- cessfully, and we outline our approach to estimating these parameters. This includes a method for reverse engineering actual demand levels from the sales ranks reported by Amazon, and approaches to estimating demand elasticity, variable costs and the optimality of pricing choices directly from publicly available e-commerce data. Our analysis raises many new challenges to the reliable statistical analysis of e-commerce data and we conclude with a brief summary of some salient ones.
  • 【期刊】 Discussion of Ryan and Tucker's "Heterogeneity and the Dynamics of Technology Adoption"

    作者:Arun Sundararajan 机构:New York University ; New York University 年份:2007
    摘要:
  • 【期刊】 Network effects, nonlinear pricing and entry deterrence

    摘要:A number of products that display positive network e?ects are used in variable quantitiesby heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, webservices and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network e?ects are in?u-enced by gross consumption, rather than simply by user base. Moreover, the value an individual customerderives on account of these network e?ects may be related to the extent of their individual consumption,and therefore, the network e?ects may be heterogeneous across customers. This paper presents a model of nonlinear pricing in the presence of such network e?ects, under incompleteinformation, and with the threat of competitive entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network e?ectsare modeled. Conditions under which a ful?lled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established.While network e?ects generally raise prices, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption dependon the nature of the network e?ects — in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changesin usage across customers, while in others cases, network e?ects raise the usage of all market participants.Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve anonlinear two-part tari?. These results highlight the impact of network e?ects on the standard trade-o?between price discrimination and value creation, and have important implications for pricing policy. The threat of entry generally lowers pro?ts for the monopolist, and increases customer surplus. Whennetwork e?ects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring monopoly contract is a ?xedfee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, when the magnitude of heterogeneous networke?ects is relatively high, there are no changes in total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the pricechanges merely cause a transfer of value from the seller to its customers. The presence of network e?ects,and of a credible entry threat, are also shown to increase distributional e?ciency by reducing the disparityin relative value captured by di?erent customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these resultsare discussed.
  • 【期刊】 Network effects, nonlinear pricing and entry deterrence

    摘要:A number of products that display positive network eects are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, web services and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network eects are inu- enced by gross consumption, rather than simply by user base. Moreover, the value an individual customer derives on account of these network eects may be related to the extent of their individual consumption, and therefore, the network eects may be heterogeneous across customers. This paper presents a model of nonlinear pricing in the presence of such network eects, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitive entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network eects are modeled. Conditions under which a fullled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network eects generally raise prices, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature of the network eects in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage across customers, while in others cases, network eects raise the usage of all market participants. Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve a nonlinear two-part tari. These results highlight the impact of network eects on the standard trade-o between price discrimination and value creation, and have important implications for pricing policy. The threat of entry generally lowers prots for the monopolist, and increases customer surplus. When network eects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring monopoly contract is a xed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, when the magnitude of heterogeneous network eects is relatively high, there are no changes in total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of value from the seller to its customers. The presence of network eects, and of a credible entry threat, are also shown to increase distributional eciency by reducing the disparity in relative value captured by dierent customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.
  • 【期刊】 Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing, Protection and Welfare

    作者:Arun Sundararajan 关键词:OPTIMAL LEVEL; deterrence; Digital Rights; OPTIMAL PRICING; digital piracy; pricing schedules; zero-piracy; different pricing; level of piracy; legal usage 机构:Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; New York University 年份:2003
    摘要:This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules and technological de- terrence levels in a market with digital piracy, when legal sellers can sometimes control the extent of piracy by implementing digital rights management (DRM) systems. It is shown that the seller s optimal pricing schedule can be characterized as a simple combination of the zero-piracy pricing schedule, and a piracy-indierent pricing schedule which makes all customers indierent between legal consumption and piracy. An increase in the level of piracy is shown to lower prices and prots, but may improve welfare by expanding the fraction of legal users and the volume of legal usage. In the absence of price-discrimination, the optimal level of technology-based protection against piracy is shown to be the technologically-maximal level, which maximizes the dierence between the quality of the legal and pirated goods. However, when a seller can price-discriminate, it is always optimal for them to choose a strictly lower level of technology-based protection. Moreover, if a DRM system weakens over time, due to its technology being progressively hacked, the optimal strategic response may involve either increasing or decreasing the level of technology-based protec- tion and the corresponding prices. This direction of change is related to whether the technology implementing each marginal reduction in piracy is increasingly less or more vulnerable to hacking. Pricing and technology choice guidelines based on these results are presented, some social welfare issues are discussed, and ongoing work on the role of usage externalities in pricing and protection is outlined.
  • 【期刊】 Network effects, nonlinear pricing and entry deterrence

    作者:Arun Sundararajan 机构:Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; Leonard N. Stern School of Business ; New York University 年份:2003
    摘要:A number of products that display positive network effects are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, web services and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network effects are influ- enced by gross consumption, rather than simply by user base. Moreover, the value an individual customer derives on account of these network effects may be related to the extent of their individual consumption, and therefore, the network effects may be heterogeneous across customers. This paper presents a model of nonlinear pricing in the presence of such network effects, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitive entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions under which a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network effects generally raise prices, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature of the network effects - in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage across customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants. Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve a nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on the standard trade-off between price discrimination and value creation, and have important implications for pricing policy. The threat of entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increases customer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring monopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes in total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of value from the seller to its customers. The presence of network effects, and of a credible entry threat, are also shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing the disparity in relative value captured by different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.
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